

Message Text

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 TOKYO 04414 112238 Z

41

ACTION FBO-01

INFO OCT-01 EA-04 ADP-00 L-03 A-01 PA-03 PRS-01 USIA-12

M-03 ABF-01 /030 W

----- 043783

R 111142 Z APR 73

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3038

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TOKYO 4414

E. O. 11652: N/ A

TAGS: ABLD PINT JA

SUBJ: CHANCERY LEASE

REFS: A. TOKYO 8730 (AUG 16, 1972)

B. STATE 196684 (OCT 30, 1972)

C. TOKYO 4205 (APR 7, 1973)

SUMMARY: FONOFF HAS REMINDED EMBASSY OF OUTSTANDING
GOJ REQUEST THAT USG REGULARIZE RENT PAYMENT STATUS
FOR YOKOHAMA CONSULATE AND TOKYO EMBASSY. FONMIN
OHIRA PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN ISSUES OWING TO DIET
INTERPELLATIONS, AND GOJ INTENDS EXPLAIN IN DIET THAT
NEGOTIATIONS WITH USG ARE STILL IN PROCESS AND HAVE

BEEN SINCE 1967. FONOFF CONTACTING JAL REGARDING RENT
PAYMENTS FOR YOKOHAMA CONSULATE. FONOFF REPORTS THAT
MINFIN PREPARED SELL USG EMBASSY PROPERTY FOR \$6.5-7
MILLION. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE. END SUMMARY.

1. UNRESOLVED ISSUES RESPECTING FORMER CONSULATE
PROPERTY IN YOKOHAMA AND CHANCERY PROPERTY IN TOKYO
HAVE BEEN DORMANT FOR SOME TIME UNTIL RAISED BY KOMEITO
DIET MAN KUROYANAGI IN DIET AS REPORTED REF C ON
APRIL 6. DIET INTERPELLATION SESSION HAS RESULTED IN
SUBSTANTIAL NEWS COVERAGE OF ISSUE (EXAMPLES BEING
POUCHED TO EA/ J). FURTHER, AS REPORTED REF C, FONMIN
OHIRA UNDERTOOK IN DIET TO STUDY FACTS AND PROVIDE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 TOKYO 04414 112238 Z

EARLY RESPONSE.

2. ON APRIL 10 ADMIN COUNSELOR AND EMBASSY COUNSELOR SCHMITZ WERE CALLED TO FONOFF BY HEAD FIRST NORTH AMERICA DIVISION FUKADA AND STAFF TO DISCUSS PROPERTY ISSUE. FUKADA BEGAN SESSION BY EXPLAINING THAT MINFIN NATIONAL PROPERTY SUPERVISION BUREAU HAD BEEN STUNG BHE HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR A SERIES OF INITIATIVES INVOLVING BILATERAL PROBLEMS (AUSTRIA, YUGOSLAVIA), MULTILATERAL ISSUES (ARAB- ISRAELI CONFLICT, MALTA BASE RIGHTS) AND RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST WORLD (VIETNAM, KOREA, CHINA, EAST GERMANY). ANDREOTTI HIMSELF HAS BEEN UNDERSTANDABLY LESS INVOLVED IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS BECAUSE OF PRESSING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. HIS ONLY OUTINGS ABROAD AS PRIME MINISTER PRIOR TO HIS IMMINENT VISITS TO THE U. S. AND JAPAN HAVE BEEN TRIPS TO PARIS (FOR THE EC SUMMIT) AND TO THE USSR, THE LATTER TRIP APPARENTLY HAVING BEEN PLANNED AS MUCH FOR ITS IMPACT ON INTERNAL POLITICS AS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF ITALO-SOVIET RELATIONS.

2. ITALY AND NATO

DEFENSE MINISTER TANASSI' S RECENT STATEMENT, ON THE OCCASION OF NATO' S 24 TH ANNIVERSARY, THAT ITALY CONSIDERS NATO " AN IRREPLACEABLE INSTRUMENT OF SECURITY AND PROGRESS NOT ONLY FOR THE COUNTRIES THAT ARE PARTIES TO THE TREATY BUT FOR ALL COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD" ACCURATELY REFLECTS THE FEELING OF THE GOI AND THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE THAT ITALY' S SECURITY FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE IS DEPENDENT ON THE CONTINUED INTEGRITY OF THE ALLIANCE, WITH U. S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE THUS ASSURED. INCREASED SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST, HAVE SERVED TO REINFORCE THE ITALIAN SENSE OF LOYALTY TO AND DEPENDENCE ON NATO. AS THE ITALIANS CONSIDER THE U. S. MILITARY PRESENCE THE LINCHPIN OF THE ALLIANCE, THE GOI HAS BEEN A WILLING AND COOPERATIVE HOST TO U. S. FORCES STATIONED IN ITALY, AND HAS IN RECENT YEARS BEEN RESPONSIVE TO SEVERAL U. S. REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SIXTH FLEET UNITS TO ITALIAN PORTS.

3. CSCE

ALTHOUGH WARY OF SOVIET MOTIVES, ITALIANS HAVE GENERALLY FAVORED THE DETENTE PROCESS AND HAVE MADE CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO PLANNING FOR THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE. AT PREPARATORY TALKS IN HELSINKI, THE ITALIAN TEAM HAS PLAYED AN ACTIVE ROLE IN ADVANCING WESTERN POSITIONS AND HAS TAKEN A FIRM STAND ON SEVERAL IMPORTANT ISSUES (PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY, HUMAN CONTACTS) ON WHICH NEUTRALS AND SOME ALLIES SEEM EAGER TO COMPROMISE WITH DEMANDS PUT FORTH BY THE EAST. WHILE MAKING CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ROME 02879 112232 Z

OCCASIONAL REFERENCES TO CSCE/ MBFR PARALLELISM, THE ITALIANS IN PRACTICE HAVE GENERALLY ACCEPTED THE U. S. VIEW THAT THE TWO SETS OF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE PURSUED INDEPENDENTLY.

4. MBFR

FROM THE OUTSET, THE ITALIANS HAVE VIEWED MBFR WITH MIXED FEELINGS, BELIEVING THAT IT IS A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS EXERCISE FOR WESTERN SECURITY, BUT AGREEING TO GO ALONG IN SUPPORT OF THE U. S. NEED TO QUELL CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE FOR UNILATERAL FORCE REDUCTIONS. AS A RESULT OF THIS SKEPTICISM, ITALIANS HAVE INSISTED ON TWO MAIN POINTS: A) ITALY AND OTHER NATO FLANK COUNTRIES MUST BE PRESENT AT MBFR IN SOME SORT OF OBSERVER STATUS IN ORDER TO SEE THAT REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE DO NOT IMPINGE ON FLANK SECURITY; AND B) ITALY CANNOT BE A DIRECT MBFR PARTICIPANT. THE LATTER IMPERATIVE ARISES CHIEFLY FROM FEAR ON THE PART OF THE ITALIAN MILITARY THAT DIRECT PARTICIPANT STATUS WOULD PROVIDE THE COMMUNISTS AND OTHER ITALIAN LEFTISTS WITH THE AMMUNITION TO MOUNT A CAMPAIGN FOR THE REDUCTION OF GOI DEFENSE EXPENDITURES.

5. SALT

ITALIANS HAVE WELCOMED US BRIEFINGS AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT IN NAC BEFORE AND AFTER NEGOTIATING SESSIONS, AND IT IS CLEAR THAT KEEPING THEM INFORMED OF THE PROGRESS OF SALT TALKS IS AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT IN REASSURING THEM THAT EUROPEAN INTERESTS, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS DISCUSSION OF FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS, WILL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. ITALIANS ARE OPPOSED TO EAST- WEST DISCUSSIONS OF FBS IN ANY FORUM BECAUSE OF THE NEGATIVE IMPACT FBS REDUCTIONS WOULD HAVE ON INDIGENOUS EUROPEAN DEFENSE CAPABILITIES. IF, AS THEY FEAR, IT SHOULD COME UP IN EITHER MBFR OR SALT, THEY ARE STILL UNDECIDED HOW IT SHOULD BE HANDLED. AT THE PRESENT TIME, PRELIMINARY FONOFF THINKING LEANS TO A GENERALIZED APPROACH IN SALT WHEREBY U. S. AND SOVIETS WOULD AGREE TO AN OVERALL FBS FREEZE. ITALIANS BELIEVE THAT ANY INTRODUCTION OF FBS INTO MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WOULD ENTAIL THE RISK OF ACTUAL REDUCTIONS, WHICH THE ITALIANS FIND UN-ACCEPTABLE. VOLPE

CONFIDENTIAL

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 11 APR 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: elyme
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973TOKYO04414
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: n/a
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: TOKYO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730439/aaaiejx.tel
Line Count: 164
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION FBO
Original Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 72 TOKYO 8730, 72 STATE 196684, 73 TOKYO 4205
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: elyme
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 17 SEP 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <17-Sep-2001 by shawdg>; APPROVED <23-Nov-2001 by elyme>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> gwr 971222
Subject: CHANCERY LEASE
TAGS: ABLD, PINT, JA
To: FBO
SECSTATE WASHDC
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005